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The object of this paper is to analyze, in a general equilibrium
setting with four markets, the e¢ ciency of a biofuel subsidy policy.
The analysis takes into account environmental externalities associated
both with the production and the consumption of biofuels, as well as
associated with the production of agricultural raw material. Our pre-
liminary numerical results, applied to the biodiesel subsidy policy in
France, ￿rst show that this policy increases the utility of the repre-
sentative consumer compared to the laissez-faire solution. The same
policy action leads, however, to an increased level of agricultural and
GHG emissions, in comparison with the laissez-faire solution.
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11 Introduction
There is a need to stimulate the use of biofuels given their cost of production
is higher than that of petroleum products, such as oil or gasoline1. The
development of biofuels has been encouraged by the European Union through
various directives2. The Directive 2003/96/CE of the European Commission
authorizes Member States to implement tax credits to encourage the use
of biofuels (GuindØ et al. (2007), p.3). The support towards biofuels is
generally justi￿ed by the existence of two market failures: energy security
and greenhouse gas (denoted as GHG, hereafter) emissions due to the use
of fossil fuels in the transport sector (Tyner (2007), p.2). This study3 takes
into account only the market failure due to GHG emissions and examines the
relative e¢ ciency of a biofuel tax credit policy in this context4. A biofuel tax
credit is equivalent, in some ways, to subsidize one alternative to petroleum.
This paper analyzes the e¢ ciency of a biofuel subsidy policy by taking into
account di⁄erent sources of environmental externalities such as, production
externalities, associated with the production of agricultural crop and the
production of biofuel, and also consumption externalities, associated with
the consumption of petroleum fuel and the consumption of biofuel. This
analysis allows us to compare the outcomes, in terms of e¢ ciency, of the
laissez-faire solution with the biofuel subsidy policy. This framework is also
helpful for comparing the extent of environmental externalities related to
these institutional arrangements. These comparisons are made on numerical
simulations with some real data concerning the recent biodiesel subsidy policy
of France.
In order to evaluate the relative e¢ ciency of a biofuel subsidy policy,
1Ryan et al. (2006) report a cost di⁄erential of 559 euros (in 2004 prices) between oil
seeds-based biodiesel and fossil fuel before excise tax duties and VAT.
2The Directive 2003/30/CE of the European Commission indicates an objective of 2 %
of biofuels in fuels used for transport sector in 2005, and 5,75 % in 2010, whereas current
estimates forecast a 4 % of biofuels in 2010. A Proposition of Directive on Renewable
Energies of 23th January 2008 (2008/0016 (COD)) considers a minimum of 10 % of biofuels
for each Member State.
3This paper resulted from a common re￿ exion with Florence Jacquet and Stephan
Marette.
4We exclude from this analysis the study of agricultural policies in relation with the
production of biofuels, such as price support and acreage control, or trade policies, such as
export subsidy, import tari⁄ or export quota. A survey of the policy issues when biofuels
are at stake can be found in Rajagopal and Zilberman (2007).
2we use a general equilibrium setting with four markets: the labor market,
the agricultural sector, the sector of biofuel production, and the sector of
distribution of petroleum products. We assume that all these markets are
competitive. We exclude the possibility of international trade in biofuels.
Even though the European tari⁄s on the imports of biodiesel have been small,
the volume of imports has been negligible because of non-tari⁄barriers, such
as technical standards to trade in palm oil (GuindØ et al. (2007), p.6).
We also assume that the oil price is exogenous and it is determined at the
international level. These two assumptions are in line with some papers of the
recent literature, such as the one of Gorter and Just (2007b). These authors
evaluate the e⁄ects of a biofuel mandate and excise-tax exemption, in a isolate
way and also simultaneously when both policies are in place. The analytical
results are applied to the case of US ethanol5. Gardner (2007) studies the
income e⁄ects of an ethanol subsidy and farm price support. Nevertheless,
none of these partial equilibrium models take into account environmental
externalities associated with the production and use of biofuels.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, the
general equilibrium framework allows us to consider general equilibrium ef-
fects on agricultural and biofuel prices. Second, it attempts to analyze the
e¢ ciency of a biofuel subsidy policy by taking into account environmental
externalities associated with the production and consumption of biofuels. Fi-
nally, this analysis is applied, in a numerical example, to the biodiesel subsidy
policy of France.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
describes di⁄erent equilibria associated with di⁄erent institutional arrange-
ments. Preliminary results of a numerical illustration of the biodiesel policy
in France are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 o⁄ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Model
We use a general equilibrium model under perfect competition. There are
four agents in the economy: a representative consumer, a farmer, a biofuel
producernvendor and a gasolinenoil vendor. We assume that the biofuel
producer and the biofuel vendor are the same entity.
5In a di⁄erent paper, Gorter and Just (2007a) analyze, in a similar way, the e¢ ciency
of a biofuel tax credit and the interaction e⁄ects with a price contingent farm subsidy.
3There are three goods in the economy. The agricultural product, indexed
by 1 with price (p1); is necessary for food uses and also as a raw material
for biofuel production. Biofuel is indexed by 2; with price (p2): Last, the
gasolinenoil is indexed by 3; with price (p3): The demand of the market will
be indexed by (q) and the supply by (x) for each product.
The environmental externalities could come, on the one hand, from pro-
duction activities, either agricultural production or biofuel production. We
take into account linear emission functions for simplicity. The emission func-
tion related to the agricultural production can be written as, e1 = ￿1x1;
where ￿1 is a positive constant. This pollution could be caused by the use
of nitrogen fertilizers or pesticides to increase agricultural productivity. The
carbon emission function associated with the biofuel production can be writ-
ten as, e2 = ￿2x2; where ￿2 is a positive constant. On the other hand, the
environmental externalities could also come from consumption decisions, ei-
ther from the use of biofuels or the use of petroleum products. The carbon
emission function related to the consumption of biofuel writes as, e4 = ￿4q2;
where ￿4 is a positive parameter. Finally, the carbon emission function asso-
ciated with the gasolinenoil consumption is represented by e3 = ￿3q3; where
￿3 is a positive parameter. We discuss the magnitude of these parameters in
Section 3.
Let ￿rst start by studying the decentralized equilibrium of the economy.
2.1 Decentralized Equilibrium
2.1.1 Program of the representative consumer
There is one price-taking consumer who supplies (L) units of labor inelas-
tically. It owns all the pro￿ts of the economy. There are two productive
sectors for which it can o⁄er its labor: the agricultural sector (L1) and the
sector of biofuel production (L2). The wage w is assumed to be the same in
both sectors, and it is normalized to 1: The revenue of the consumer R is
given exogenously by R = w(L1 + L2) = L:
The consumer￿ s utility function is written in the following way:
U = A ￿ a1(q1 ￿
￿
q1)
2 ￿ a2(q2 ￿
￿
q2)















q2 and q3 <
￿
q3: This utility function is assumed to be concave and
4additively separable.
The program of the consumer is to maximize its utility with respect to
q1;q2;q3; subject to its budget constraint:
Maxq1;q2;q3[U = A ￿ a1(q1 ￿
￿
q1)
2 ￿ a2(q2 ￿
￿
q2)












The ￿rst-order conditions of this program de￿ne the consumer demand
at the decentralized equilibrium described in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The demand of the representative consumer for the
agricultural product, the biofuel and the petroleum product at the decentralized
























































As expected, the consumer demand depends on all the prices of the econ-
omy, and also positively depends on the aggregate revenue L:
2.1.2 Program of the farmer
The farmer has at its disposal a constant returns to scale technology to
produce the agricultural product6. This product is used both for food con-
sumption and as a raw material for biofuel production. In the case of ethanol
production, this agricultural product could be sugar beet, corn or wheat, and
rapeseed or sun￿ ower in the case of biodiesel production.
6This assumption is also included in the green accounting model of Brannlund et al.
(2008). However, Rubin et al. (2008) assume a decreasing returns to scale technology in
their model in which the costs and bene￿ts of biofuels in US are quanti￿ed.
5The production function of the farmer is given by:
x1 = ￿L1 (4)
where ￿ is a positive agricultural productivity parameter and L1 is the
labor force in the agricultural sector.
The production activity is a source of revenue for the farmer, L1 (the
wage is numeraire, w = 1), but it is also a source of negative externality, in
terms of agricultural emissions, e1.
The pro￿t of the farmer is written in the following way:
￿1 = p1x1 ￿ C1(x1;e1) (5)
where the term C1(x1;e1) represents the linear cost function of the farmer.
This cost is increasing with the level of production (x1); but decreasing with
the level of emissions (e1): The last property is explained by the fact that
the abatement activity is costly for the farmer.
The pro￿t function can be rewritten in the following manner:
￿1 = p1x1 ￿ [L1(x1) ￿ ￿1e1] (6)
where ￿1 is a positive constant: The last term of the pro￿t function,
(￿1e1), represents a saving on the productive agricultural labor. The idea is
that the abatement of agricultural emissions is costly in terms of productive
labor. Or in other words, there is an economic gain for the farmer to emit.
The zero pro￿t condition, ￿1 = 0; implies:
















The positivity of p1 requires that ￿￿1￿1 < 1: It appears that the market
price of the agricultural good decreases with the parameters ￿; ￿1 and ￿1:
When the agricultural productivity and the gains from emissions increase,
6the supply of the farmer also does. This, in turn, decreases the market price
of the agricultural good.
2.1.3 Program of the biofuel producer
As the farmer, the biofuel producer operates with a constant returns to scale
technology7. The factors of production are comprised of the productive labor,
L2; and the agricultural raw material,
￿
q1. These factors of production are
assumed to be complementary for the production process.




where ￿ and " are positive constants, and L2 is the labor force in the sector




q1 = "L2 (10)
This production activity provides a revenue for the producer, L2, but
induces an environmental cost, in terms of emissions, e2. This pollution
could come from CO2 emissions caused during the transformation process of
the agricultural raw material to biofuel.
The pro￿t of the biofuel producer is written in the following way:
￿2 = p2x2 ￿ C2(x2;e2;
￿
q1) (11)
where the term C2(x2;e2;
￿
q1) represents the linear cost function of the
biofuel producer. This cost is increasing with the level of production (x2); but
decreasing with the level of emissions (e2) and the level of the agricultural raw
material (
￿
q1): Again, the second property is related to the cost of abatement
activities incurred by the biofuel producer.
The pro￿t function can be rewritten in the following manner:
￿2 = p2x2 ￿ (L2(x2) ￿ ￿2e2) ￿ p1
￿
q1 (12)
7De Gorter and Just (2007b) use the same assumption for ethanol production. They
mention several corn-oil price breakeven estimates in the literature which all determine a
linear relationship.
7where ￿2 is a positive constant: As for the pro￿t of the farmer, the term,
(￿2e2), represents a saving on the productive labor.











On the one hand, it appears that the market price of the biofuel increases
with that of the agricultural good. When the latter increases, the cost of
the biofuel producer also does, which in turn induces the biofuel producer to
decrease its production. On the other hand, the market price of the biofuel
decreases with the parameters "; ￿; ￿2 and ￿2: When the labor productivity,
the productivity of the agricultural input, and the gains from emissions in
the biofuel sector increase, the supply of the biofuel producer also does. This,
in turn, decreases the market price of the biofuel.
When we introduce the expression of p1 of Equation 8 into Equation 13,





￿￿(1 ￿ "￿2￿2) + "(1 ￿ ￿￿1￿1)
￿￿"
(14)
The positivity of p2 requires that ￿￿(1 ￿ "￿2￿2) + "(1 ￿ ￿￿1￿1) > 0:
2.1.4 Program of the gasolinenoil vendor
We assume that the price of petroleum products is exogenous, since the price
of oil is determined at the international level by the production decisions of
OPEC countries. This is a plausible assumption because EU biofuel produc-
tion in 2005 is only 1.2 % of the total fuel, the majority (78 %) of this being
biodiesel (EEA (2008), p.20). The zero pro￿t condition, ￿3(p3;x3) = 0;
also applies for the gasolinenoil distributor. We do not explicit this pro￿t
function, because the given price of the oil implies that the supply of the
distributor is perfectly elastic at this price. Therefore, the demand of the
market determines the supply of the distributor.
2.1.5 Equilibrium levels of outcomes and emissions
The theorem of non-substitution says that the price of products is determined
by the price of the factors of production, if technologies are constant returns
8to scale. Then, here, we can claim that the price of the agricultural product
and the price of the biofuel are determined respectively by the price of labor
(w = 1); and the prices of labor and the agricultural raw material (p1).
Equations 8 and 14 give the expressions of prices p1 and p2: The same theorem
also implies that the quantities are given by the demand of the economy
(demand determines the supply).
Lemma 2 The supply of the biofuel, the agricultural product and








































These equilibrium quantities imply the following equilibrium levels of
emissions.





































We now turn to study the outcome of a subsidy policy to biofuel produc-
ers.
2.2 Subsidy to Biofuel Producers
The most widely used policy instrument in the context of biofuel develop-
ment is the biofuel tax credit (de Gorter and Just (2007a), Kojima et al.
9(2007)). The motives behind the implementation of a biofuel subsidy could
be numerous: to reduce the reliance on oil imports, to enhance farm incomes,
and to promote rural development (de Gorter and Just (2007b, p.4). The
European Commission has identi￿ed, however, the reduction of the GHG
caused by fossil fuels as the principal objective of biofuel policy (JRC (2008),
p.8). In our numerical example, we calibrate the reference model as to have
higher GHG emissions with the gasoline than with the biodiesel.
As does Gardner (2007), we model the tax exemption policy as a subsidy
to biofuel which is an alternative to petroleum. More speci￿cally, this subsidy
is modeled as a unit subsidy proportional to the quantity of biofuels produced.
For example, the US federal subsidy is currently 51 cents per gallon of ethanol
(Tyner (2007), p.1).
With a unit subsidy s > 0, the pro￿t of the biofuel producer writes:
￿2 = p2x2 ￿ (L2(x2) ￿ ￿2e2) ￿ p1
￿
q1 + sx2 (17)










As expected, the price of the biofuel producer, p2; falls with the subsidy
rate, because the subsidy reduces its cost of production8.





￿￿(1 ￿ "￿2￿2 ￿ "s) + "(1 ￿ ￿￿1￿1)
￿￿"
(19)
The positivity of p2 requires that ￿￿(1￿"￿2￿2 ￿"s)+"(1￿￿￿1￿1) > 0:
The equilibrium levels of the quantities under the subsidy policy are de-
￿ned in a similar way to those at the decentralized equilibrium, except for
the prices. The demand is not directly a⁄ected with the subsidy, but only
indirectly via the change in prices. The supply of the biofuel, the agri-




































￿￿" : These equilibrium
8Note that the price of the farmer p1 is unchanged.










In the next section, the comparison of the outcomes of the decentral-
ized equilibrium with the biofuel subsidy policy is presented in a numerical
example for the biodiesel subsidy policy in France.
3 A Numerical Application
France set more ambitious targets than the European Union in terms of
biofuel consumption: 7 % of biofuels in 2010 and 10 % in 2015. In 2006,
the consumption of biodiesel was 630:000 t, which was greater than that of
corn based ethanol, 230:000 t. Therefore, we focus on the biodiesel policy
of France. Biofuel production units bene￿t from partial tax credits on the
￿internal tax on consumption￿(TIC). This tax applies to consumed volumes
of fuel, and it is equal to 42;84 euros/hl for gasoline. In 2006, the level of the
tax credit for biodiesel (EMHV) was 25 euros/hl (GuindØ et al. (2007)). So
the TIC which applies to the biodiesel is equal to 17;84 euros/hl. Then, the
market prices of gasoline and biodiesel integrate this tax in the calibration
of the model. The price of 1 hl of gasoline (with TIC) in 2006 is taken to be
equal to p3 = 115 euros.
In order to evaluate the e⁄ects of the subsidy policy over the decentralized
equilibrium, we proceed in the following way. The tax exemption for the
biofuel vendor is simply a subsidy for himself. We model the tax exemption
as a reduction in the production cost of the biofuel producer, since the vendor
and the producer are the same entity. Let the unit subsidy, s, be given by the
amount of the tax exemption for biodiesel, i.e. s = 25 euros/hl. We consider
the following values of the parameters which respect the concavity of the
utility function of the consumer. It is important to note that the values of







q2 A = L a1 a2 a3 ￿ = ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ = "
800 100000 0:9 0:1 0:6 0:1
To calibrate the values of the emission parameters, we proceed in the
following way. The parameter ￿1 is assumed to be linked only to nitrogen
emissions and pesticides caused by the agricultural production. We use as an
initial value for this parameter ￿1 = 0:1: It is well known that the agricultural
11activity also causes GHG emissions such as CO2 and N20 emissions. In fact,
we only account for CO2 emissions in this exercice. Those arising from the
agricultural production, the biofuel production and consumption, as well as
from the gasoline consumption are all encountered in the calibrated values
of the parameters ￿2, ￿3 and ￿4. In general, biofuels produce lower CO2
emissions than petroleum products. The study JEC (2007) carried out under
the supervision of JRC indicates that ￿most EU commercial processes save
between 18 and 50 % GHG￿(JRC (2008), p.8). Then, one can claim that the
value of the parameter ￿3 is higher than the sum of parameters ￿2 and ￿4:
We use as initial values the following ones: ￿2 = 0:2; ￿3 = 0:9 and ￿4 = 0:2:




These values of the parameters imply the following levels of the market
prices of the agricultural raw material, pd
1 = 10; the biofuel, pd
2 = 127; and
the biofuel with the subsidy, ps
2 = 102: In the following, we summarize re-
spectively the outcomes of the laissez-faire solution and the biofuel subsidy
policy:








45931 203 24 613 24 793 124 682








51062 267 37 595 37 791 188 661
We ￿rst make some observations about the equilibrium quantities for
both institutional arrangements. Our numerical ￿ndings ￿rst indicate that
the agricultural product is the most consumed good in both cases, thanks to
its low price (pd
1) and its relative weight in the utility function. Secondly, in
both situations, the demand for the biofuel (q2) is lower than that for gasoline
(q3), because of the higher market price of the biofuel on the gasoline and
its lower weight in the utility of the consumer. In fact, the ratio qd
2=qd
3 at
the decentralized equilibrium is equal to 0:18: In 2006, the blending ratio
of the biodiesel over the gasoline in France was equal to 0:018: Eventhough
9The life-cycle-assesment of rape seed oil methyl ester versus fossil diesel for France in
2000 indicates a more pessimistic result for the biodiesel: respectively a global warming
potential (GWP) of 200 g (CO2 eq./MJ useful energy) and 280 g (CO2 eq./MJ useful
energy), which leads to the ratio,
GWP (biodiesel)
GWP (diesel) = 71%. This evaluation takes into account
all GHG, especially N20 emissions (Fair V Programme (2008), p. 120).
12our numerical numbers are far from being similar to these real numbers,
which is important is the magnitude of the changes between the outcomes
of the laissez-faire solution and the biodiesel subsidy policy. In this latter
case, the ratio qs
2=qs
3 is increased to attain 0:28: Finally, the levels of CO2
emissions caused by the production and the consumption of biodiesel are
always equal, e2 = e4; because the emission parameters in both cases are
equal by assumption, and the supply is equal to demand at the equilibrium.
Let us now assess the e⁄ects on the relative economic and environmental
e¢ ciency of a biofuel subsidy policy over the laissez-faire solution. We ￿rst
note this policy increases the utility of the representative consumer. In fact,
this policy implies a reduction in the market price of the biofuel (ps
2 < pd
2), as
well as an increase in the quantity consumed by the consumer qs
2 > qd
2: The
equilibrium quantities of the agricultural product and the gasoline are only
slightly decreased, because of the substitution e⁄ect between the three goods.
This positive conclusion on the relative economic e¢ ciency of the biofuel
subsidy is, however, reversed if we consider environmental impacts. Even
though the CO2 emissions caused by conventional gasoline (e3) is reduced
thanks to a lower fossil fuel consumption ( qs
3 > qd
3), the carbon emissions
provoked by the biofuel production and consumption (e2 and e4) increase.
Concerning nitrogen emissions caused by agriculture, they increase in spite
of the reduction of the food consumption. This comes from the additional
demand of the agricultural raw material for the biofuel production stipulated
by the subsidy.
4 Conclusion
The object of this paper was to assess, with numerical simulations, the rel-
ative economic and environmental e¢ ciency of the french biodiesel subsidy
policy. This analysis is e⁄ectuated in a general equilibrium setting with four
markets.
Our preliminary results ￿rst show that this policy increases the utility
of the representative consumer compared to the laissez-faire solution. This
is related to the relative increase of the biofuel consumption. The same
policy action causes, however, an increase in nitrogen and CO2 emissions in
comparison with the laissez-faire solution. These preliminary results indicate
the need to design biofuels subsidy policies whose objective is to increase the
income of agents, without compromising the environmental quality that they
13bene￿t. This calls for biofuel blending objectives conditional to attain some
environmental criteria, such as the certi￿cation of biofuels. The Proposition
of Directive on Renewable Energies of the 23th January 2008 (2008/0016
(COD)) requires that biofuels respect a number of environmental criteria10
in order to be counted for the 10 % national objective.
This preliminary version of the analysis is limited in scope. Our numerical
application only incorporated the fuel prices, the biofuel tax credit, and some
information on the life-cycle-assessment of the biodiesel versus diesel. A more
complete evaluation of the french biodiesel subsidy policy would require other
data, such as the ones on agricultural and biofuel productions, as well as
on consumption. As a next step, it could be interesting to investigate the
e¢ ciency of a biodiesel subsidy policy in the presence of a binding blending
mandate, as it is currently the case in France.
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